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Abstract
This paper tests whether the behaviour of households in different countries is homogeneous
with respect to the influence of religion on income. The violation of the homogeneity as-
sumption would have two consequences. First, results based on country studies might not
be applicable to other countries. Second, one should be careful when pooling cross-country
data in this type of research. Data at household level of the European and World Values
Survey are pooled for 25 Western countries. We estimate simultaneously an income and a
religion equation to correct for the endogeneity of religiosity. We find that estimation out-
comes are different between low and high-income countries. Whereas church membership is
found to have a positive effect on income for high-income countries, this effect is negative
for low-income countries. This result is robust to denominational distribution, participation
effects and alternative measures of religiosity.
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1 Introduction
Religion is believed to affect income levels and growth. Theories have put forward different channels
through which religion influences income, positively or negatively (see the survey of Iannaccone,
1998). Azzi and Ehrenberg (1975) were the first to apply the neo-classical framework to explain the
allocation of time between working and religious activities. Religious activities are at the expense
of productive activities, resulting in a lower income. In line with this, Barro and McClearly (2003)
argue that belief is the crucial factor influencing income. An increase in church attendance without
strengthening beliefs would depress income growth. The Weber-hypothesis is the prime example
stressing a favourable effect of Protestant ethic (Weber, 1930). More recent theories see religion
as an important component of social capital (Sacerdote and Glaeser, 2001 and Gruber, 2005).
Churches are seen as part of a social network that contributes to better income opportunities.
The income effects of religion are thus theoretically undetermined but also the empirical support
remains mixed.
This paper focuses on the estimation of the total effect of religion on income. The central question is
whether this effect is heterogeneous between countries, a question barely explored in the literature.
We distinguish two types of studies in the literature; see the summary in Table 1. The first type
estimates the relation for a single country, either with a cross-section at a micro-level (studies
1− 7) or with time series at the macro level (study 8). All micro-studies are applied to the USA
and Canada, except Bettendorf and Dijkgraaf (2005, The Netherlands). The question whether the
results found for one country can be considered representative for other countries is analyzed in
Mangeloja (2005). After estimating the same specification separately for eight OECD-countries,
he concludes that the effect of religion on income growth is not uniform between countries. While
he finds an insignificant effect of participation on income for five countries, two countries show a
negative and one a positive effect.1
1He also reports panel estimation results, in which belief in hell has a significant and church attendance has an
insignificant effect on economic growth.
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The second type of studies is based on a panel of US-states (studies 9−11) or of countries (study 12).
Barro and McCleary (2003) use a pooled dataset for 41 countries and 3 time periods.2 They con-
clude that religious beliefs (in hell, heaven and an after-life) relative to attendance is the main chan-
nel through which religion stimulates economic growth. As these studies pool cross-country/state
data, they implicitly assume that the behavior of individuals in different countries/states is homo-
genous with respect to the impact of religion.
This paper tests whether the relationship between religion and income can indeed be assumed
to hold equally for sets of countries. In other words, we examine whether findings from single-
country studies might be applied to other countries and whether pooling data in multi-country
studies is appropriate. The literature on the role of religion in general suggests that its impact
is heterogeneous over countries. Huber (2005) argues, for instance, that countries differ in their
relation between belief and participation, and Sacerdote and Glaeser (2001) report cross-country
differences in the effect of education on religion.
We check the consequences of heterogeneity by using household level data for 25 Western countries.
Next to heterogeneity, we also deal with the endogeneity problem in estimation.3 According to
the survey of Iannaccone (1998), income affects religious variables (like attendance, membership,
frequency of prayer and beliefs). Although this suggests that there might be a bi-causal relationship
between religion and income, most studies ignore the endogeneity of religion. Exceptions are Barro
and McCleary (2003), Lipford and Tollison (2003) and Bettendorf and Dijkgraaf (2005). In this
study we deal with the endogeneity problem by estimating a system of equations. The estimation
of a system of equations also enables the identification of the main determinants of religion. We
find that heterogeneity matters substantially between low and high-income countries. While we
find a positive effect of religion on income for high-income countries, this effect is negative for
low-income countries. This main finding is found to be robust by several sensitivity analyses.
2Mc Cleary and Barro (2006) have extended this dataset to 53 countries, yielding similar results. Sala-i-Martin
et al. (2004) find that the fractions of different religions in the population belong to the significant variables in
explaining economic growth, employing a cross-section of 88 countries.
3This paper does exactly what Barro and McCleary (2003, p. 10) propose: ‘To distinguish country-wide effects
from individual effects, we would have to use micro data, as well as deal with the issues of causality’.
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Table 1: Literature: effect of religion on income
Nr. Country Level data Measure religion Effect on income
1. USA Micro: men Membership Positive (Jewish)
2. Canada Micro: men Membership Insignificant (within Memberships)
3. Canada Micro: men Membership Positive (Jewish)
Insignificant (Protestants vs. Catholics)
4. USA Micro: men Membership Positive (Jewish)
5. USA Micro: men Membership, Positive (Jewish and Catholic)
Insignificant (within Protestants)
Participation Negative (Protestants)
Insignificant (other Memberships)
6. USA Micro: women Membership, Insignificant (pay per hour)
Participation Positive (on hours worked)
7. Netherlands Micro Membership Insignificant (with endogeneity)
Participation Insignificant (with endogeneity)
8. Eight OECD Country Participation, Positive (1 country)
Negative (2 countries)
Insignificant (5 countries)
Beliefs Positive (2 countries)
Negative (1 countries)
Insignificant (5 countries)
9. USA States Membership Positive (Jewish)
Insignificant (liberal Protestant)
Negative (Catholic and Orthodox
Protestant)
10. USA States Membership Insignificant
11. USA States Membership Negative
12. Panel (max. 41) Country Membership, Negative
Participation, Negative
Beliefs Positive
1. Chiswick (1983), 2. Tomes (1984), 3. Tomes (1985), 4. Chiswick (1993), 5. Steen (1996),
6. Cornwell et al. (2003), 7. Bettendorf and Dijkgraaf (2005), 8. Mangeloja (2005), 9. Heath et al.
(1995), 10. Crain and Lee (1999), 11. Lipford and Tollison (2003), 12. Barro and McCleary (2003).
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A related paper is Guiso et al. (2003). They also study the impact of religion on income by
using micro-data from the World Values Survey. We notice two main differences. First, whereas
we estimate directly the relationship between religion and income, Guiso et al. (2003) focus on
the impact of religious beliefs on attitudes that are considered conducive to higher income. As a
consequence, the income decile is one of our dependent variables, while they use it as an exogenous
control variable. Second, Guiso et al. (2003) do not consider differential effects across countries,
although they use a more heterogeneous panel with 66 countries. They do stress heterogeneous
effects over denominations, a result we also discuss (in section 5.3).
The next two sections discuss the data and the estimation methodology. Section four reports the
estimation results, followed by sensitivity analyses in section five. The last section concludes.
2 Data
Data are from the European and World Values Survey.4 This survey is held in a large number of
countries in four waves. We use the 1999 data. Data are available for a wide variety of religious
measures and respondent characteristics. As our focus is on Western religions, we exclude countries
where Eastern religions are dominant. This means that the data include most of the European
countries, next to Canada, New Zealand and the United States (see Table 2 for a list of countries
included).
An important source for exclusion is whether sufficient information is available on income. In the
survey a card with ten income deciles was shown to respondents. The respondents were asked in
which class their household is in, counting all wages, salaries, pensions and other incomes.5 As the
income deciles are chosen country specific, the decile information of the different countries does
not match. In many cases the decile points were not based on the regular ten equal sized groups.
For five countries the decile points rise with a fixed and equal amount in all deciles, while for six
4Data and codebooks are downloadable from www.worldvaluessurvey.org.
5As household size is not available, we cannot calculate the income per household member.
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Table 2: Descriptive statistics
Average Average GDP Number of
income decile membership per capita observations
Low-income countries
Bulgaria 2.28 0.71 6 738
Russia 1.42 0.53 7 2030
Latvia 2.98 0.61 7 821
Lithuania 3.11 0.82 8 742
Croatia 4.80 0.87 8 690
Estonia 3.54 0.26 9 733
Slovak 4.07 0.79 11 1028
Czech Republic 4.43 0.37 13 1471
Slovenia 1.14 0.71 16 541
Malta 5.46 0.99 16 586
Average 3.32 0.67 10 938
High-income countries
Spain 5.20 0.84 19 1306
New Zealand 7.55 0.82 20 882
Sweden 7.92 0.75 24 883
Italy 6.66 0.83 24 1140
France 5.83 0.58 24 1104
Germany 6.11 0.62 25 1425
Netherlands 6.92 0.44 27 847
Canada 7.81 0.74 27 1535
Austria 6.50 0.87 27 1053
Iceland 7.35 0.96 27 750
Ireland 6.28 0.93 28 703
Northern-Ireland 5.70 0.84 28 647
Switzerland 6.91 0.91 28 890
Denmark 8.34 0.90 28 743
United States 8.53 0.76 34 974
Average 6.91 0.79 26 992
Average all countries (unweighted) 5.47 0.74 20 970
GDP per capita in 1000 dollars using PPP’s.
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Figure 1: Original deciles (dots) and final deciles (triangles)
countries the higher deciles have a larger interval than the lower deciles.6 For the whole panel
this results in unequal frequencies. Figure 1 shows that deciles 2 till 5 are overrepresented in our
sample at the cost of especially deciles 8, 9 and 10. The distribution is even more unequal per
country. In Germany, e.g., 80% of the respondents is found in deciles 2 till 5, while the last three
deciles include only 3.8% of respondents. Another example is Latvia, where 32.5% of respondents
are in decile 2, while this is only 1.5% for the last three deciles.
For cross-country estimation it is appropriate to make the deciles comparable over countries. We
need to transform the income information in a common currency and price level. Given the
available information, we use the following procedure.7 First, we calculate the decile points in US
dollars using purchasing power parities from the Penn World Table (2000). Note that this results in
exclusion of a number of countries for which decile points are not given.8 Second, we calculate the
average level of income per decile as the average of the lower and upper bound of the decile.9 Third,
6Countries in the first group are Germany, Austria, Sweden, Iceland and Malta. The second group consists of
The Netherlands, Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania, Canada and the USA.
7We test whether our results depend on this procedure using the original decile information in a sensitivity
analysis (section 5.4).
8This results in exclusion of observations for Australia, Belarus, Britain, Belgium, Finland, Hungary, Luxem-
bourg, Norway. Poland, Portugal, Ukraine and Romania.
9The income level of the first decile is set at 50% of the first decile point. The last decile income level is equal
to the last decile point.
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all individuals are sorted on their average income level. Finally, new deciles are created aiming
at the regular ten equal sized groups. This results in a cross-section with more or less the same
number of observations per decile. These numbers are not exactly equal as households with equal
incomes have to be in the same decile.10 The decile with the lowest number of observations has a
share of 9.5%, while the decile with the highest number of observations has a share of 10.3% (see
the triangles in Figure 1). This procedure implies that our basic specifications test the influence
of income differences between households across all countries.
As the focus of the paper is on adults, we exclude observations for households where only kids
(probably in most cases students) are present. Furthermore, we exclude all observations with
missing information for the basic variables. This results in 24,262 observations for 25 countries.
In our dataset several measures are available how religious individuals are. In the next section
we focus on church membership as it is one of the most objective measures. However, we present
sensitivity analysis for six other measures (see section 5.1). Thus, the main religion variable is a
dummy with value 1 if the respondent says that he or she is a church member and zero otherwise.
Table 2 gives the average values for income, membership and the number of observations. As we
analyze whether heterogeneity exists between countries, we include also the GDP per capita (in
PPP dollars).11 In our basic models we test whether a difference exists with respect to the religion
− income relation between low-income and high-income countries. We do this by including a
dummy for high-income countries. High-income countries are defined as the countries with a GDP
per capita that is larger or equal than the level of Spain. It would, of course, be attractive to
split these groups of countries further to test for heterogeneity at a lower level. Unfortunately,
the methodology necessary to tackle both endogeneity and heterogeneity requires a relatively high
number of observations, rendering estimation on smaller subsamples less appropriate. It should be
kept in mind that the chosen terminology with respect to low and high-income might be misleading.
10Note that this means that a natural alternative, creating equal deciles per country, is not possible as we cannot
discriminate between households with the same income level. For all countries combined this is not a serious obstacle
as we have much more data available.
11The correlation between the average income decile and GDP per capita is 0.85. This suggests that our obser-
vations might be interpreted as representative for the whole population.
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The two groups might also be labelled as former communist versus capitalist countries, or as
traditional versus postmaterialist countries (compare Inglehart and Baker, 2000). We do not
suggest, therefore, that the income difference between countries is the only or most important
relevant characteristic.
We include also socio-economic characteristics, as reported in the European and World Value Sur-
vey (A list of variables and descriptive statistics are available in Appendix A and B, respectively).
• The variable Age equals the age of the respondent and both linear and quadratic terms are
included.
• The dummy Man equals one if the respondent is male.
• The dummy BreadwinnerNoPart is one if the respondent is the breadwinner without a
partner; NoBreadwinnerPart is one if the respondent has a partner who is the breadwinner.
The benchmark covers the case in which the respondent is a breadwinner with a partner.
• The dummy NoKids is one when the household does not include kids.
• The variable Education is 0 if the respondent has hardly any education, 1 for finishing lower
level, 2 for medium level and 3 for high level.
• Country fixed effects are included to correct for country specific features.
The coefficients of all the control variables were significant in the single equation estimations.
However, estimation of the full system seems to demand too much from the data, as indicated by
large standard errors. We therefore choose to restrict the number of variables. We defined a new
variable Agecom by restricting the shape of the quadratic function to the single equation results.12
In the same vein, the weights of the education composite are also based on single estimation results.
12We define the age variable as Agecom = α Age + β Age2, where α and β are based on the free estimation of
the single income equation. Since we include γ Agecom in the system estimation, we in fact impose the restriction
that β/α = −0.012. The same restriction is used for the religion equation to guarantee comparability between the
equations. Although restrictive, age effects in the income and religion single equations are highly correlated (0.7).
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3 Methodology
We are primarily interested in the effect of religion on income. However, as described in the
former section, the literature shows that estimating an income equation will probably result in
biased coefficients due to endogeneity. As our results also indicate endogeneity problems and
system estimation is more efficient than single estimation, we only present results for the system
approach.13 As income and religion are measured as discrete variables, a probit-estimator is
applied. We take membership of a church as our main measure of religion.14 Membership is
denoted by the dummy y1i with the value 1 if the household i is member of a church. As income
is available only in deciles, y2i denotes the before tax income class of household i.
The system of structural equations is expressed in terms of the latent variables. This specification
assumes that households have completely flexibility in their decisions but that the researcher can
only observe the choices as discrete variables (see Blundell and Smith, 1994).15 The structural
model written in terms of the latent variables (y∗1 and y∗2) and vectors of socio-economic control
variables (x1 and x2) is:
y∗1i = α1y
∗
2i + β
0
1x1i + u1i y1i = 1 if y
∗
1i > 0, = 0 otherwise
y∗2i = α2y
∗
1i + β
0
2x2i + u2i y2i = j if μj−1 < y∗2i ≤ μj j = 1, ., J
(3.1)
The income equation contains J+1 cutoffs μj . Assuming that y∗2 has an infinite support yields that
μ0 = −∞ and μJ = ∞. Since x2 includes a constant, μ1 = 0 has to be imposed. The remaining
J − 2 cutoffs are estimated.
13The single specifications are clearly rejected against the system approach on the basis of a log likelihood ratio
test. Furthermore, we find support for endogeneity in the system estimations as the correlation between the residuals
of the two equations (ρ) , is significant at 1%. As income influences religion a single equation approach will result
in biased coefficients. Our main finding, a positive effect of religion on income for high-income countries and a
negative effect for low-income countries, however, is also found for the single equation approach. Results for the
single equations are available on request.
14Although data are available about the specific denomination of individuals, we have chosen to concentrate
on membership in general. Main motivation is that endogeneity is difficult to handle since incorporating several
denomination dummies would necessitate a system of more than two equations. For our specification with probits
this is technically unsolvable. However, we analyse the robustness of our conclusions for denomination in section
5.3.
15Maddala (1983, p. 124) interprets a latent variable as a measure of intensions. Blundell and Smith (1994)
consider a class of structural models which are simultaneous in the observed dependent variables. As a consequence,
the reduced form can not be derived explicitly and extra coherency restrictions have to be imposed.
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Model (3.1) cannot be directly estimated since it contains non-observables at the right-hand side.
Therefore, the reduced form equations are derived as, with D ≡ (1− α1α2),
y∗1i = β¯
0
1xi + v1i β¯01xi = (β01x1i + α1β02x2i) /D v1i = (u1i + α1u2i) /D
y∗2i = β¯
0
2xi + v2i β¯
0
2xi = (α2β
0
1x1i + β
0
2x2i) /D v2i = (α2u1i + u2i) /D
(3.2)
where xi = x1i ∪ x2i. A variable that occurs in both structural equations thus has a coefficient
equal to (β1 + α1β2) /D and (α2β1 + β2) /D in the reduced form equations, respectively. Iden-
tification of the structural coefficients requires that x1 contains at least one variable that is not
included in x2 and vice versa.16 The reduced form disturbances vk are assumed to have a joint
normal distribution with means zero, variances one, and covariance ρ.17 To compare the results of
the system estimation, we also apply a probit-regression to each equation separately. The single
equations are specified similarly as in (3.1), where the latent variable y∗k at the RHS is replaced by
the observed yk.18 The estimation procedure is explained in Appendix C.
4 Estimation results
Results are presented in Table 3. The identifying variable in the religion equation is the dummy for
households for which the partner of the respondent is the breadwinner (NoBreadwinnerPart); for
the income equation it is the dummy for households without kids (NoKid). We first discuss the
estimated cross-effects between membership and income; next, we briefly discuss the (marginal)
effects of the control variables.
16As identifying restrictions we use variables that are only significant in one equation (see next section).
17This implies that the structural disturbances uk = vk − αkvk0 (k 6= k0) are normally distributed with means
zero, variances (1 + α2k − 2αkρ) and covariance (1 + α1α2) ρ− α1 − α2.
18Note that the rejection of the hypothesis ρ = 0 means that system estimation is preferred above single equation
regressions.
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4.1 Cross-effects between religion and income
Model A represents the specification with the assumption that the relation between religion and
income is homogeneous between countries. According to this model, we find hardly evidence of a
relationship between religion and income as the coefficient for membership is insignificant in the
income equation, while the coefficient for income in the membership equation is only significant at
10%. The insignificant membership coefficient is in accordance with some studies using microdata
for one country (Tomes (1984), Crain and Lee (1999) and Cornwell et al. (2003)). It contradicts
results from Barro and McCleary (2003) which are also based on an international database.19 They
find that beliefs positively affect income, while church attendance affects income negatively.
Model B introduces heterogeneity as all effects are now allowed to differ between low and high-
income countries.20 We do this by introducing an interaction effect with the high-income dummy
(see section 3 for definition). Model A, which does not discriminate between low and high-income
countries, is clearly rejected against model B using a Likelihood-ratio test (LLR=236 with 12
restrictions). This is not surprising as all but one interaction coefficients are significant for the
income model, while one of them is significant in the religion model. More important, however,
is that our main result is affected by allowing for heterogeneity. Now we find a negative effect of
religion on income for low-income countries and a positive effect for high-income countries. This
means that the result of Barro and McCleary (2003) is only reproduced for high-income countries.
The opposite effect is found for low-income countries. This confirms our hypothesis that including
heterogeneity might be necessary to estimate the true effects between income and religion. The
effect of income on religion weakens when heterogeneity is introduced. Although a negative effect
is found for low-income countries and a positive effect for high-income countries, the effects are
barely significant.
19They use average figures for countries and thus have one observation per country per year (observations are
available for three years). As dependent variable they use economic growth, which makes it possible to include
countries we have to exclude.
20An alternative model with only heterogeneous effects for the income and religion variables is clearly rejected
against model B with a Likelihood-ratio test of 130 (10 restrictions). Note that there is evidence for the hypothesis
that also other explaining characteristics have a heterogeneous relationship with religion. Sacerdote and Glaeser
(2001), for instance, find cross-country difference in the relation between education and religion.
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Table 3: Results homogeneity (A), heterogeneity (B) and sub-samples for low-income (C) and
high-income (D)
A B C D
Effect on income
Member 0.07 (0.10) -1.15 (0.33)∗∗∗ -1.20 (0.32)∗∗∗
*high-income 1.68 (0.37)∗∗∗ 0.52 (0.16)∗∗∗
Agecom 1.03 (0.07)∗∗∗ 0.16 (0.31) 0.20 (0.30)
*high-income 1.03 (0.32)∗∗∗ 1.15 (0.09)∗∗∗
Man 0.26 (0.04)∗∗∗ -0.31 (0.15)∗∗ -0.32 (0.15)∗∗
*high-income 0.73 (0.15)∗∗∗ 0.41 (0.04)∗∗∗
BreadwinnerNoPart -0.77 (0.03)∗∗∗ -0.79 (0.07)∗∗∗ -0.83 (0.07)∗∗∗
*high-income 0.10 (0.09) -0.67 (0.06)∗∗∗
No breadwinnerPart 0.21 (0.02)∗∗∗ 0.07 (0.06) 0.07 (0.06)
*high-income 0.19 (0.07)∗∗∗ 0.25 (0.03)∗∗∗
Education 0.34 (0.01)∗∗∗ 0.20 (0.04)∗∗∗ 0.22 (0.04)∗∗∗
*high-income 0.19 (0.04)∗∗∗ 0.38 (0.02)∗∗∗
Effect on religion
Income -0.24 (0.13)∗ -0.50 (0.28)∗ -0.48 (0.25)∗
Income*high-income 0.51 (0.32) 0.01 (0.15)
Agecom -0.44 (0.14)∗∗∗ -0.30 (0.34) -0.29 (0.33)
*high-income -0.23 (0.37) -0.53 (0.14)∗∗∗
Man -0.25 (0.03)∗∗∗ -0.33 (0.04)∗∗∗ -0.33 (0.04)∗∗∗
*high-income 0.12 (0.06)∗∗ -0.21 (0.04)∗∗∗
BreadwinnerNoPart -0.36 (0.12)∗∗∗ -0.43 (0.22)∗ -0.43 (0.21)∗∗
*high-income 0.19 (0.26) -0.24 (0.14)∗
No kid -0.19 (0.03)∗∗∗ -0.09 (0.09) -0.09 (0.08)
*high-income -0.09 (0.09) -0.18 (0.03)∗∗∗
Education -0.01 (0.05) 0.06 (0.09) 0.06 (0.08)
*high-income -0.14 (0.10) -0.08 (0.05)
ρ -0.02 (0.01)∗ -0.02 (0.01)∗ -0.08 (0.02)∗∗∗ 0.02 (0.01)
LLH -53,288 -53,170 -18,464 -34,534
Observations 24,262 24,262 9,380 14,882
Standard errors between brackets. Coefficients with ***/**/* are significant at the 1%/5%/10% level.
All specifications estimated with country fixed effects.
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Full heterogeneity is assumed in model C (the sub-sample for the low-income countries) and D (the
sub-sample for high-income countries). These models are estimated allowing also for heterogeneity
in the structure of the error terms. Model B is clearly rejected against C and D (LLR=344 with 1
restriction). For both equations the differences in coefficients are very modest, however, compared
to model B. The main result, a negative effect of religion on income for low-income countries and
a positive effect for high-income countries, is found again.
Concluding, we find that the effect of religion on income is not stable over groups of countries.
The average income level of countries seems to influence the relationship between these variables.
When this type of heterogeneity is neglected, estimation results depend on the coincidental mix
of data from low and high-income countries. If this mix is dominated by low income countries,
the probability is much larger that negative effects are found, while in the opposite case positive
results might prevail.
4.2 Effects of socio-economic characteristics
The estimation results for the control variables are briefly discussed by way of the marginal effects
of the reduced forms (based on column C and D in Table 3). The marginal effects averaged over
the households are reported. From the marginal probabilities computed for each income decile,
the average decile change is shown in Figure 2 (The calculation of the marginal effects is explained
in more detail in Appendix D).
Since age is modelled as a hump-shaped quadratic function, a positive coefficient means that income
first rises and then falls with age.21 As the marginal effects are evaluated on average at a high age,
age has a negative effect on income in both sub-samples.22 Households for which the respondent
is a man earn a higher income than when the respondent is female. For low-income countries,
the structural coefficient is negative but the total effect gets positive by the upwards effect of
21With cross-section data, age effects can obviously not be distinguished from cohort effects. The proper inter-
pretation of the age coefficients includes the effect of the year of birth, next to age, of the respondent.
22Marginal effects of age are multiplied by its standard deviation to get a comparable scaling.
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Figure 2: Marginal effects socio-economic characteristics on income
lower church membership. Breadwinners without a partner obviously have a lower income than
breadwinners with a partner. The reverse effect holds when the respondent is not the breadwinner
but the partner is. Since its structural coefficient is restricted to zero, the effect of NoKid is
running indirectly through the impact on church membership. Increasing the education index by
one unit improves income by around half a decile in both country groups.
The marginal effects of the exogenous variables on membership can be found in Figure 3. Age
effects now follow a U-pattern, implying that marginal effects get positive for higher ages.23 Male
respondents are less often member of a church than female respondents. The three dummies
representing the family composition all have a depressing effect on religiosity. Finally, membership
seems to fall with the education level (although the structural coefficients are not significant).24
23 Sawkins et al. (1997) find a similar pattern for the relation between age and church attendance in Great Britain.
In contrast, Barro and McCleary (2003) find that the believes in heaven, as well as in hell, fall with the share of the
population older than 65 (whereas its effect on church attendance is not significant).
24This conflicts with Barro and McCleary (2003), who find that higher education levels lead to higher levels of
church membership, as well as to more religious participation. Sacerdote and Glaeser (2001) argue that households
with a higher education more often choose to leave the church, but intensify their religious behavior when they
decide to stay. Sawkins et al. (1997) also find a positive effect of education on church attendance.
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Figure 3: Marginal effects socio-economic characteristics on religion
5 Sensitivity analysis
This sections shows that our main findings are robust to various types of sensitivity analysis and
analyses other types of heterogeneity.
5.1 Measurement of religion
In this section we test whether our results depend on the choice of the religious variable, which
is for instance the case for Barro and McCleary (2003). We expect that membership does not
always measure religiosity properly. Membership, for instance, is very high in countries with a
state religion (like in Scandinavian countries), while other religious measures point to a low level
of religion.25
We estimate our preferred sub-sample models (C and D) for six alternative measures. These
measures are based on the answers of the following questions: (i) do you believe in God, (ii) are
you a religious person, (iii) do you have confidence in church, (iv) do you believe in heaven, (v)
25Compare, for instance, the high level of membership of Denmark (Table 2) with the very low level of respondents
stating that God or religion is important (Table B.2).
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Table 4: Results for alternative religious variables
Belief in Religious Confidence Religion Belief in God
Effect on Variable God person in church important heaven important
Low-income countries
Income Religion -0.29 -1.65 -2.21 -1.35 -7.31 -1.75
Religion Income -2.56 -0.49 0.17 -0.23 -0.49 -0.34
ρ -0.07 -0.07 -0.06 -0.09 -0.07 -0.07
Observations 8,298 8,700 8,898 9154 7,344 9,044
% religious 0.72 0.67 0.54 0.47 0.40 0.37
High-income countries
Income Religion 0.34 0.39 0.93 0.39 0.72 0.38
Religion Income -0.10 -0.03 -0.04 0.01 0.25 -0.15
ρ -0.02 -0.00 -0.02 -0.06 -0.07 -0.08
Observations 13,950 14,330 14,580 14,761 13,443 14,682
% religious 0.79 0.66 0.52 0.51 0.52 0.42
Bold coefficients are significant at 5%. All specifications estimated with country fixed effects.
Results for other explaining variables are available on request.
is God important in your life and (vi) is religion important in your life. According to the number
of households that answered positively, belief in God and membership are the broadest religion
measures (76% of respondents believe in God, 75% are members of a church), while the importance
of God is the strictest measure (44% finds God important).
Results for the cross-effects are presented in Table 4. Note that we use a smaller database for these
analyses compared with our base case as the measures are not available for all households. Almost
all conclusions are robust when the results for different religion measures are compared with our
previous results for membership. This is remarkable as the measures vary significantly with respect
to the fraction of religious households. All specifications result in a positive effect of religion on
income for high-income countries and a negative effect for the low-income countries. In the latter
case, the effect is insignificant for the two smallest samples. For the opposite relation again only
weak evidence is found for an effect of income on religion. Also for the alternative measures system
estimation is preferred as ρ is often significant at 1%.
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Table 5: Results for membership versus participation
Effect on Variable >1/week >1/month Special <1/year
Low-income countries
Income Religion -1.01 -1.03 -0.89 -1.01
Religion Income -0.80 -0.74 -0.66 -0.62
ρ -0.10 -0.10 -0.08 -0.07
Observations 5,227 6,034 7,698 8,557
% religious 32% 41% 54% 58%
High-income countries
Income Religion 0.22 0.22 0.33 0.43
Religion Income -0.08 0.01 -0.06 -0.05
ρ -0.01 0.01 0.02 0.02
Observations 6,771 8,368 10,448 12,559
% religious 50% 60% 68% 77%
Bold coefficients are significant at 5%. All specifications estimated with country fixed effects.
Results for other explaining variables are available on request.
5.2 Membership or participation
Another way to measure religion is by active participation. Barro and McCleary (2003) stress that
membership and participation have an opposite impact on economic growth. Guiso et al. (2003)
show that the aspect of religion that seems to matter is different for various attitudes. Trust
towards others, for instance, is affected mainly by participation, while intolerance is correlated
with affiliation. We study in this section whether effects on income are also different for individuals
who participate actively in church services compared with members who go not or less often to
church. For each respondent we know whether church services are attended at least (i) once a
week, (ii) once a month, (iii) on special days like Easter and Christmas, (iv) less than once a year
or (v) never. While we have all these respondents in our results presented before, the first column
of Table 5 restricts the group of members to households that attend services at least once a week
with again non-members as benchmark.26 In subsequent columns, the sample is extended with
members who participate less frequently.
26An alternative would be to define members with less participation as non-members. We prefer our procedure
as this guarantees that we have the same group as a benchmark throughout the paper.
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Our main result is found, irrespective of the intensity of participation. In all cases we find a
positive effect of membership on income for high-income countries and a negative effect for low-
income countries. For low-income countries the effect of membership on income is stable across
households with different intensities. This suggests that the main effect is driven by membership
rather than participation. For high-income countries a declining pattern in intensities emerges.
This means that all religious households have a higher income level, but that more active households
benefit less. Although the coefficients are not significantly different from each other, it should be
kept in mind that the estimated effect in the last column is cumulated over all included intensity
categories. The effect for respondents going to church less than once a year is therefore probably
higher than the estimated 0.43.
For the effect of income on membership, we see the opposite result. While all coefficients are
insignificant for high-income countries, the effects for low-income countries show an increasing
pattern when intensity rises. The most frequent churchgoers respond more elastically to an income
change than members that hardly attend services.
The exercise is repeated for the six alternative religion variables with similar results (see the income
coefficients in Appendix Table E.2). In all cases positive effects are found for high-income and
negative effects for low-income countries. All income coefficients are significant for all participation
classes for three measures: ‘Religious person’, ‘Religion important’ and ‘God important’. However,
many insignificant coefficients are found for the other measures.
5.3 Denomination
In the analysis presented so far we neglected the role of denominations. This might result in biased
conclusions if our results are in fact driven by denominational choice rather than by the role of
religion. A significant difference between countries for the income effect of religion could originate
from differences in the distribution of denominations. This is illustrated by the example in which
Roman Catholics have a lower income than Protestants, high-income countries are dominated by
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Table 6: Results for heterogeneity with respect to denomination
Members Roman Catholics Protestants Non-Roman Catholics
versus versus versus versus
Effect on Variable non-members non-members non-members non-members
Low-income countries
Income Religion -1.20 -0.91 -1.60 -2.73
Religion Income -0.48 -0.22 -1.02 -0.89
ρ -0.08 -0.06 -0.06 -0.10
Observations 9,380 6,954 3,927 5,966
% religious 67% 49% 12% 40%
High-income countries
Income Religion 0.52 0.55 0.59 0.51
Religion Income 0.01 0.04 -0.07 -0.07
ρ 0.02 0.02 0.05 0.01
Observations 14,882 9,611 7,624 8,608
% religious 79% 65% 56% 61%
Bold coefficients are significant at 5%. All specifications estimated with country fixed effects.
Results for other explaining variables are available on request.
Protestants and low-income countries by Roman Catholics. In this paragraph we analyse whether
our findings indeed depend on denomination. Note that we cannot test this by including denom-
ination dummies as this would require a system of more than two equations, which is technically
unsolvable for our specification with probits. Therefore, we restrict our dataset to individuals which
are either non-member or member of a specific church, which leaves us with only two equations to
estimate. Interestingly, this test explores not only the question whether households with the same
denomination behave differently when living in different countries but also whether the effect of
religion differs across denominations (Guiso et al. (2003) confirm the last type of heterogeneity).
Table 6 presents the results. The first column repeats the base case of Table 3. The next three
columns are based on subsamples containing only, next to non-members, Roman Catholics, Prot-
estants and non-Roman Catholics, respectively (the last group is defined as Protestants, members
of the Orthodox Church plus members of other denominations). Our main result, a significantly
different effect of religion on income between high-income and low-income countries, is found for
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all denominations. This means that the effect of religion on income is also heterogeneous between
countries, within a single denomination. Even for the relatively homogenous Roman-Catholic
church, the relations differ between low and high-income countries. However, effects are not signi-
ficant different from zero in all cases. Interestingly, Roman Catholics seem to drive the negative
effect for low-income countries as we find an insignificant effect for Protestants and non-Roman
Catholics. This result might suffer from the relatively low number of observations for the last
two groups. For high-income countries Protestants and other members of a non-Roman Catholic
church seem to drive the positive effect. This conclusion is robust as the Roman Catholics sample
is large, while the effect of religion on income is insignificant.27 It should be kept in mind that we
focus only on differences between Roman Catholics, Protestants and non-Roman Catholics, while
differences might also be significant within these denominations. Exploring this heterogeneity asks,
however, too much from the data.
5.4 Gradual heterogeneity
It is not clear whether the consequences of heterogeneity between countries are gradual or not.
Column B of Table 3 reports results following a dummy-approach to differentiate between low
and high-income countries. The gradual heterogeneity model in Table 7 tests interaction effects
in terms of levels of GDP per capita. This model finds indeed that the relationship between
membership and income level of individuals depends on the GDP-level of countries. Membership
stimulates the income level of individuals more when the average income in a country is higher.
The effect is negative till a GDP level of 22,000 dollars per capita, just above the level of our
poorest high-income country (compare Table 2).
27Appendix Table E.1 presents the income effects of religion for the other six religion measures. In main lines the
discussed results are robust.
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Table 7: Results gradual heterogeneity and national income distribution
Original deciles Original deciles
Gradual heterogeneity low-income high-income
Effect on income
Member -2.60 -1.05 0.50
*GDP 0.12
Effect on religion
Income 0.81 -0.51 0.01
*GDP -0.02
ρ -0.02 -0.11 0.01
LLH -53,144 -24,201 -37,327
Observations 24,262 9,380 14,882
Bold coefficients are significant at 5%. All specifications estimated with country fixed effects.
Results for other explaining variables are available on request.
5.5 National income distribution
The original data on income suffer from the problem that the deciles are differently defined over
the countries. We therefore choose to express all incomes in PPP-$’s and rank all households
according to a single ‘worldwide’ income distribution. As a consequence, all households of the
poorest country, Bulgaria, are located in the lowest four deciles, whereas most households of the
richest country, the US, are found in the five top deciles. We are thus assuming that households
with the same income level (and other characteristics) behave the same, irrespective of the country
they live (except for the country fixed effects).
Another reasonable assumption is that not the position in the international but in the national
distribution matters. Households living in different countries are considered to be identical if they
report the same ‘national’ income decile. Notice that a Bulgarian household from the top decile
might earn a lower real income than a US-household from a medium decile. The main drawback
of using this information is that it does not take into account that the income information is
collected following different methods. As a robustness check we re-estimated models C and D
from Table 3 with the original decile information. Results in Table 7 show that all findings on the
22
income−religion relation are reproduced using the original information. The differences between
all coefficients remain remarkably small.
6 Conclusions
The literature generally assumes a homogeneous relation between income and religion when data
are pooled from different countries. Combining household level data for 25 Western countries
enables to test this assumption explicitly. We find a clear distinction between low and high-income
countries. While a negative effect of religion on income is found for low-income countries, this effect
is positive for high-income countries. This result is robust to alternative measures of religiosity,
denominational distribution and participation levels. It should be kept in mind that the chosen
terminology with respect to low and high-income might be misleading. The classification might
also reflect the difference between former communist and capitalist countries, or the difference
between traditional and postmaterialist countries. We do not suggest, therefore, that differences
in income levels between countries is the only or most important relevant characteristic explaining
the found difference in the relation between religion and income.
This result implies in the first place that one should be careful when pooling cross-country data
in this type of research. The specific mix of countries included might determine the outcome. If,
for instance, the dataset is dominated by high-income countries, it is more likely that a positive
income effect is found. This is even more the case when the sample is unbalanced with respect
to denominational distribution, since the relation also differs between Roman Catholics and non-
Roman Catholics. If, for instance, the dataset is also dominated by Protestant countries, the
probability to find a positive effect even increases. This suggests that research should check for
composition effects, for example by varying included countries. For future research, we plan to
combine large micro datasets from different countries. This would allow testing for individual
country heterogeneity, where this paper only was able to test heterogeneity between groups of
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countries.28
The heterogeneity finding implies in the second place that results based on single country studies
might not be applicable to other countries. This suggests that it is worthwhile to consider countries
not yet investigated. Since the current literature is dominated by studies for the United States,
adding evidence from other countries would improve the understanding of the relation between
religion and income in general.
28 In Bettendorf and Dijkgraaf (2005), we employed a large micro dataset for the Netherlands. We did not find
significant cross-effects between religion and income.
24
References
Azzi C., Ehrenberg R., 1975. Household allocation of time and church attendance, Journal of
Political Economy 83, 27-56.
Barro R.J., McCleary R., 2003. Religion and economic growth, NBER Working Paper 9682.
Bettendorf L., Dijkgraaf E., 2005. The bicausal relation between religion and income, Tinbergen
discussion paper 105/2, Erasmus University Rotterdam.
Blundell R., Smith R.J., 1994. Coherency and estimation in simultaneous models with censored
or qualitative dependent variables, Journal of Econometrics 64, 355-373.
Chiswick B.R., 1983. The earnings and human capital of American Jews, The Journal of Human
Resources 18, 313-336.
Chiswick B.R., 1993. The skills and economic status of American Jewry: Trends over the Last
Half-Century, Journal of Labor Economics 11, 229-242.
Cornwell C.M., Tinsley K.L., Warren R.S., 2003. Religious background and the labor supply and
wages of young women, University of Georgia.
Crain W.M., Lee K.J., 1999. Economic growth regressions for the American states: a sensitivity
analysis, Economic Inquiry 37, 242-257.
Green W.H., 1997. Econometric Analysis, Prentice-Hall.
Gruber J., 2005. Religious market structure, religious participation, and outcomes: is religion
good for you?, NBER Working Paper 11377.
Guiso L., Sapienza P., Zingales L., 2003. People’s opium? Religion and economic attitudes,
Journal of Monetary Economics 50, 225-282.
Hall B.H., Link A.N., Scott J.T., 2000. Universities as research partners, NBER Working Paper
7643.
25
Heath W.C., Waters M.S., Watson J.K., 1995. Religion and economic welfare: an empirical
analysis of state per capita income, Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization 27, 129-
142.
Huber J.D., 2005. Religious belief, religious participation, and social policy attitudes across coun-
tries, Paper presented at the Annual Meetings of the Midwest Political Science Association,
Chicago.
Iannaccone L.R., 1998. Introduction to the economics of religion, Journal of Economic Literature
36, 1465-1495.
Inglehart, R., Baker, W.E., 2000. Modernization, cultural change, and the persistence of tradi-
tional values, American Sociological Review 65, 19-51.
Lipford J.W., Tollison R.D., 2003. Religious participation and income, Journal of Economic
Behavior & Organization 51, 249-260.
Maddala G.S., 1983. Limited-dependent and qualitative variables in econometrics, Cambridge
University Press.
Mangeloja E., 2005. Economic growth and religious production efficiency, Applied Economics 37,
2349-2359.
McCleary, R.M., Barro R.J. (2006), Religion and economy, Journal of Economic Perspectives 20:
49-72.
Sacerdote B., Glaeser E.L., 2001. Education and religion, NBER Working Paper 8080.
Sala-i-Martin, X., G. Doppelhofer and R.I. Miller (2004), Determinants of long-term growth: A
Bayesian averaging of classical estimates (BACE) approach, American Economic Review, 93,
813-835.
Sawkins, J., 1997. Church attendance in Great Britain: An ordered logit approach, Applied
Economics 29, 125-134.
26
Steen T.P., 1996. Religion and earnings: Evidence from the NLS Youth Cohort, International
Journal of Social Economics 23, 47-58.
Tomes N., 1984. The effects of religion and denomination on earnings and the returns to human
capital, The Journal of Human Resources 19, 472-488.
Tomes N., 1985. Religion and the earnings function, American Economic Review 75, 245-250.
Weber M., 1930. The Protestant ethic and the spirit of capitalism, Allen & Unwin: London.
27
Appendix A List of variables
Income (decile) Decile of household income (deciles based on equal number of
households per class)
The following variables are dummies that equal one when:
Member Respondent is member of a church
Belief in God Respondent answers yes to question do you belief in God
Religious person Respondent answers yes to question are you a religious person
Confid church Respondent answers yes to question do you have confidence in church
Relig. import. Respondent answers yes to question do you belief in heaven
Belief in Heaven Respondent answers yes to question is God important in your life
God import. Respondent answers yes to question is religion important in your life
Man Respondent is male
BreadwinnerNoPart Respondent is breadwinner, has no partner
No breadwinnerPart Respondent is not the breadwinner, has partner
No kid Respondent has no kids
Educationlow Respondent has education at junior general secondary level
Educationmid Respondent has education at senior or pre-university general
secondary level or at vocational secondary level
Educationhigh Respondenthas education at higher professional or university level
High-income Respondent lives in country with relative high per capita GDP
Age Age of respondent (integer)
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Appendix B Descriptive statistics
Table B.1: Descriptive statistics: average values exogenous variables
Age Man BreadwNoPart Nobreadwart Nokid Education
Bulgaria 53.00 0.42 0.21 0.41 0.00 1.86
Russia 49.00 0.41 0.39 0.30 0.11 1.63
Latvia 49.64 0.45 0.40 0.25 0.14 1.59
Lithuania 46.42 0.49 0.28 0.31 0.12 1.96
Croatia 44.20 0.39 0.19 0.42 0.15 1.74
Estonia 48.79 0.45 0.38 0.27 0.17 1.43
Slovak 47.13 0.47 0.23 0.37 0.11 1.31
Czech 50.87 0.46 0.29 0.35 0.10 1.54
Slovenia 47.90 0.48 0.25 0.41 0.12 1.36
Malta 49.58 0.53 0.16 0.37 0.15 1.38
Spain 50.88 0.49 0.23 0.38 0.19 0.89
New Zeal. 46.31 0.47 0.22 0.46 0.18 1.72
Sweden 45.56 0.49 0.38 0.32 0.29 1.72
Italy 50.59 0.51 0.21 0.37 0.20 1.29
France 48.17 0.55 0.38 0.26 0.19 1.20
Germany 51.43 0.43 0.41 0.29 0.22 1.08
Netherl. 47.47 0.53 0.40 0.29 0.29 1.76
Canada 47.51 0.41 0.34 0.37 0.23 1.67
Austria 49.39 0.44 0.23 0.42 0.14 0.90
Iceland 46.83 0.50 0.31 0.29 0.27 1.20
Ireland 44.96 0.51 0.42 0.16 0.17 1.36
N-Ireland 47.55 0.52 0.38 0.28 0.21 1.48
Switzerl. 48.90 0.49 0.24 0.35 0.18 1.30
Denmark 49.95 0.49 0.35 0.30 0.21 1.07
USA 44.70 0.42 0.36 0.38 0.24 2.07
Average 48.27 0.47 0.31 0.33 0.17 1.46
- Low-inc. 48.55 0.45 0.29 0.34 0.11 1.60
- High-inc. 48.01 0.48 0.32 0.33 0.21 1.38
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Table B.2: Descriptive statistics: average values religious variables
Belief in Member Religious Confid. Relig. Belief in God
God church person church import. Heaven import.
Bulgaria 0.60 0.71 0.50 0.35 0.49 0.31 0.28
Russia 0.66 0.54 0.66 0.60 0.49 0.40 0.36
Latvia 0.78 0.65 0.78 0.67 0.40 0.36 0.39
Lithuania 0.86 0.86 0.87 0.76 0.68 0.70 0.61
Croatia 0.93 0.87 0.85 0.68 0.80 0.62 0.60
Estonia 0.50 0.31 0.44 0.44 0.23 0.23 0.19
Slovak 0.85 0.83 0.85 0.74 0.67 0.63 0.61
Czech 0.37 0.34 0.41 0.22 0.23 0.22 0.19
Slovenia 0.66 0.71 0.69 0.39 0.38 0.30 0.30
Malta 1.00 0.99 0.78 0.85 0.93 0.88 0.92
Spain 0.85 0.85 0.67 0.51 0.53 0.55 0.40
New Zeal. 0.75 0.83 0.59 0.42 0.45 0.64 0.42
Sweden 0.52 0.75 0.40 0.46 0.36 0.32 0.18
Italy 0.93 0.84 0.89 0.73 0.79 0.62 0.65
France 0.60 0.58 0.48 0.46 0.38 0.33 0.23
Germany 0.55 0.60 0.49 0.39 0.32 0.27 0.30
Netherl. 0.58 0.44 0.60 0.29 0.38 0.36 0.26
Canada 0.92 0.76 0.80 0.64 0.68 0.78 0.65
Austria 0.87 0.87 0.83 0.43 0.57 0.43 0.48
Iceland 0.84 0.97 0.77 0.67 0.57 0.60 0.41
Ireland 0.97 0.94 0.77 0.60 0.79 0.88 0.64
N-Ireland 0.92 0.86 0.65 0.64 0.62 0.83 0.55
Switzerl. 0.85 0.91 0.62 0.45 0.50 0.48 0.45
Denmark 0.69 0.89 0.75 0.62 0.29 0.19 0.15
USA 0.96 0.78 0.86 0.78 0.86 0.89 0.81
Average 0.76 0.75 0.68 0.55 0.54 0.51 0.44
- Low-inc. 0.72 0.68 0.68 0.57 0.53 0.47 0.45
- High-inc. 0.79 0.79 0.68 0.54 0.54 0.54 0.44
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Appendix C System estimation
This appendix is based on Hall et al. (2000, Appendix B), Greene (1997) and Maddala (1983).
The probability that y1i = 1 and y2i = j for observation i is given by
Pr(y1i = 1, y2i = j) =Pr(y∗1i > 0, μj−1 < y
∗
2i ≤ μj)
=Pr(v1i > −β¯01xi, μj−1 − β¯02xi < v2i ≤ μj − β¯02xi)
=Pr(v1i > −β¯01xi, v2i ≤ μj − β¯02xi)−
Pr(v1i > −β¯01xi, v2i ≤ μj−1 − β¯02xi)
=Φ2(β¯01xi, μj − β¯02xi, −ρ)− Φ2(β¯01xi, μj−1 − β¯02xi, −ρ) (C.1)
where Φ2(a, b, ρ) is the cumulative unit bivariate normal distribution with correlation coefficient ρ
evaluated at cutoff points a and b. Notice that for the two outside classes (j = 1 or j = J), the
expression simplifies to
Pr(y1i = 1, y2i = 1) = Φ2(β¯01xi, μ1 − β¯02xi, −ρ)
Pr(y1i = 1, y2i = J) = Φ(β¯01xi)− Φ2(β¯01xi, μJ−1 − β¯02xi, −ρ)
where Φ denotes the univariate standard normal cdf. Analogously, the probability that y1i = 0
and y2i = j is given by
Pr(y1i = 0, y2i = j) = Φ2(−β¯01xi, μj − β¯02xi, ρ)− Φ2(−β¯01xi, μj−1 − β¯02xi, ρ) (C.2)
The log likelihood function over all observations is obtained by combining the logarithms of the
probabilities (C.1) and (C.2):
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lnL =
NX
i=1
JX
j=1
{I(y1i = 1, y2i = j) lnPr(y1i = 1, y2i = j) + I(y1i = 0, y2i = j) lnPr(y1i = 0, y2i = j)}
(C.3)
where I indicates a dummy variable that equals one when observation i matches the combination
of y1 and y2. Maximizing (C.3) gives the estimates of the structural coefficients (αk, βk), the cutoff
points (μj) and the correlation ρ.
Notice that in the special case with ρ = 0, the bivariate system separates into the binary Probit
and the ordered Probit since Φ2(a, b, 0) = Φ(a)Φ(b). The log likelihood (C.3) simplifies to the sum
of the log likelihood functions of the single equations.
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Appendix D Marginal effects
Marginal effects are calculated for the unconditional mean functions of the structural (3.1) and the
reduced (3.2) equations (see Greene, 1997, p. 910). The structural equations (3.1) are evaluated
after substituting uk = vk − αkvk0 (k 6= k0) and (3.2):
y∗ki = αkyˆ
∗
k0i + β
0
kxki + vki with yˆ
∗
ki = β¯
0
kxi
Discrete variables. The ‘marginal’ effects of dummy variables in the reduced form equations
are computed as:
∆Pr(y1i= 1)
∆xi(l)
=Φ
¡
β¯01xi |xi(l) = 1
¢
− Φ
¡
β¯01xi |xi(l) = 0
¢
(D.1)
∆Pr(y2i= j)
∆xi(l)
=
£
Φ
¡
μj − β¯02xi |xi(l) = 1
¢
− Φ
¡
μj−1 − β¯02xi |xi(l) = 1
¢¤
−
£
Φ
¡
μj − β¯02xi |xi(l) = 0
¢
− Φ
¡
μj−1 − β¯02xi |xi(l) = 0
¢¤
(D.2)
where Φ is the normal cumulative distribution function. Similar expressions hold for the structural
equations. The dummies BreadwinnerNoPart and NoBreadwinnerPart are exclusive. In the
calculation of the marginal effect of one of these dummies, the competing dummy is set to zero.
The index variable Education is increased by one scale to evaluate the marginal effect.
Continuous variables. Continuous variables include Age for all equations and the latent vari-
ables in the structural equations. Marginal effects for the reduced form equations are calculated
using:
∂Pr(y1i= 1)
∂xi(l)
= φ
¡
β¯01xi
¢
β¯1(l) (D.3)
∂Pr(y2i= j)
∂xi(l)
= −
£
φ
¡
μj − β¯02xi
¢
− φ
¡
μj−1 − β¯02xi
¢¤
β¯2(l) (D.4)
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where φ is the standard normal density function.29 Similar expressions hold for the structural
equations. The marginal effect of a continuous variable is multiplied by its standard deviation to
obtain a better scaling.
Reported marginal effects. The sample average of the individual marginal effects is reported.
From the marginal effects computed from the income equation, the average change in decile is
reported as:
PJ
j
j
N
∙PN
i=1
∆Pr(y2i= j)
∆xi(l)
¸
(D.5)
The structure of the following, detailed Tables is as follows:
• In the first 10 columns, the first line gives the average probability for each income decile (%).
The remaining lines give the marginal effects on the probabilities (%).
• The first entry in the column labelled ‘Income’ is the average decile. The other entries give
the marginal change in the average decile, calculated using (D.5).
• The last column labelled ‘Member’ gives the average probability and the marginal effects for
the religion equation (%).
29Note that for simplicity the quadratic effect of age is not included in the formula. However, this effect is included
in the reported marginal effects.
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Marginal effects Low-income countries
These marginal effects are based on the estimates in column C in Table 3.
Table D.1: Average probability and marginal effects with structural form equations
Decile income 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 decile member
Average prob. 26.64 18.33 17.84 12.56 10.49 6.49 4.03 2.21 1.36 0.05 3.17 62.05
Marginal effects
Income -21.27
Member 15.52 4.37 1.97 -1.81 -4.65 -4.99 -4.40 -3.19 -2.66 -0.15 -1.12
Age 0.55 0.04 -0.12 -0.14 -0.14 -0.09 -0.06 -0.03 -0.02 0.00 -0.02 1.15
Man 5.03 1.38 0.57 -0.58 -1.46 -1.57 -1.40 -1.03 -0.89 -0.06 -0.36 -10.10
BrNoPart1 14.01 4.19 0.68 -3.03 -4.99 -4.28 -3.19 -1.97 -1.35 -0.06 -0.89 -13.10
NoBrPart1 -1.05 -0.35 -0.25 0.06 0.32 0.39 0.37 0.27 0.24 0.01 0.09 0.00
No kids 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 -2.68
Education -3.33 -0.96 -0.53 0.27 0.93 1.09 1.02 0.78 0.70 0.05 0.25 1.94
1. Br=Breadwinner
Table D.2: Average probability and marginal effects with reduced form equations
Decile income 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 decile member
Average prob. 26.64 18.33 17.84 12.56 10.49 6.49 4.03 2.21 1.36 0.05 3.17 62.05
Marginal effects
Age 3.56 0.25 -0.76 -0.91 -0.89 -0.58 -0.36 -0.19 -0.10 0.00 -0.15 3.53
Man -2.61 -0.74 -0.33 0.31 0.78 0.84 0.74 0.54 0.45 0.03 0.19 -12.53
BrNoPart1 12.41 3.71 0.57 -2.73 -4.45 -3.79 -2.80 -1.72 -1.16 -0.05 -0.79 -2.44
NoBrPart1 -2.45 -0.81 -0.58 0.14 0.75 0.91 0.84 0.63 0.54 0.03 0.20 -2.38
No kids -3.71 -1.07 -0.56 0.32 1.04 1.20 1.12 0.85 0.76 0.05 0.28 -6.26
Education -4.94 -1.45 -0.86 0.31 1.31 1.61 1.56 1.22 1.15 0.08 0.39 -2.84
1. Br=Breadwinner
35
Marginal effects in high-income countries
These marginal effects are based on the estimates in column D in Table 3.
Table D.3: Average probability and marginal effects with structural form equations
Decile income 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 decile member
Average prob. 0.36 4.60 5.27 8.53 10.18 11.10 14.19 15.43 14.87 15.47 6.88 77.37
Marginal effects
Income 0.19
Member -0.22 -1.86 -1.57 -1.91 -1.56 -0.98 -0.27 0.95 2.32 5.10 0.48
Age 0.51 2.19 0.96 0.62 0.10 -0.31 -0.74 -1.06 -1.13 -1.14 -0.26 1.39
Man -0.30 -2.72 -2.28 -2.73 -2.19 -1.36 -0.36 1.34 3.26 7.35 0.68 -5.56
BrNoPart1 0.53 5.39 4.46 4.96 3.47 1.57 -0.65 -3.61 -6.21 -9.89 -1.17 -6.47
NoBrPart1 -0.06 -1.10 -1.24 -1.75 -1.65 -1.25 -0.74 0.42 1.96 5.38 0.41 0.00
No kids 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 -4.78
Education -0.21 -2.02 -1.87 -2.45 -2.21 -1.62 -0.90 0.68 2.76 7.84 0.62 -2.23
1. Br=Breadwinner
Table D.4: Average probability and marginal effects with reduced form equations
Decile income 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 decile member
Average prob. 0.36 4.60 5.27 8.53 10.18 11.10 14.19 15.43 14.87 15.47 6.88 77.37
Marginal effects
Age 0.39 1.67 0.73 0.48 0.07 -0.23 -0.57 -0.81 -0.86 -0.87 -0.20 1.37
Man -0.22 -1.98 -1.68 -2.02 -1.63 -1.01 -0.27 1.00 2.43 5.40 0.50 -5.50
BrNoPart1 0.66 6.63 5.36 5.85 4.00 1.71 -0.93 -4.38 -7.35 -11.55 -1.40 -6.65
NoBrPart1 -0.05 -1.03 -1.20 -1.73 -1.66 -1.29 -0.81 0.33 1.91 5.55 0.41 0.05
No kids 0.08 0.62 0.51 0.62 0.50 0.31 0.07 -0.33 -0.76 -1.61 -0.15 -4.80
Education -0.20 -1.85 -1.69 -2.20 -1.96 -1.42 -0.75 0.66 2.50 6.90 0.55 -2.15
1. Br=Breadwinner
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Appendix E Extended sensitivity analysis
Table E.1: Income results for different denominations: six other religion variables
Members Roman Catholics Protestants Non-Roman
versus versus versus Catholics versus
non-members non-members non-members non-members
Belief in God
Low-income Coef. -0.29 -5.01 na na
Obs. 8298 6065 3192 5075
High-income Coef. 0.34 0.25 0.63 0.53
Obs. 13950 9107 6937 7893
Religious person
Low-income Coef. -1.65 -1.89 -2.39 -2.11
Obs. 8700 6402 3505 5432
High-income Coef. 0.39 0.34 0.56 0.49
Obs. 14330 9282 7259 8214
Confidence in church
Low-income Coef. -2.21 -3.16 na -4.93
Obs. 8898 6555 3613 5575
High-income Coef. 0.93 1.23 1.13 1.05
Obs. 14580 9441 7398 8359
Religion important
Low-income Coef. -1.35 -1.22 -2.38 -2.12
Obs. 9154 6797 3829 5798
High-income Coef. 0.39 0.31 0.60 0.52
Obs. 14761 9529 7536 8515
Belief in heaven
Low-income Coef. -7.31 -9.40 na na
Obs. 7344 5630 3156 4588
High-income Coef. 0.72 0.44 1.04 0.98
Obs. 13443 8709 6885 7807
God important
Low-income Coef. -1.75 -1.44 na -3.23
Obs. 9044 6671 3724 5714
High-income Coef. 0.38 0.28 0.57 0.55
Obs. 14682 9478 7476 8452
Bold coefficients are significant at 5%. All specifications estimated with country fixed effects.
Results for other explaining variables are available on request.
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Table E.2: Income results for membership versus participation: six other religion variables
>1/week >1/month Special <1/year
Belief in God
Low-income Coef. na -3.35 -2.09 -2.38
Obs. 4519 5295 6829 7581
High-income Coef. 0.29 0.26 0.32 0.38
Obs. 6479 8041 9996 11921
Religious person
Low-income Coef. -1.60 -1.32 -1.21 -1.35
Obs. 4814 5593 7150 7951
High-income Coef. 0.31 0.29 0.34 0.39
Obs. 6573 8141 10122 12138
Confidence in church
Low-income Coef. -5.46 -2.13 -1.46 -1.87
Obs. 4917 5707 7299 8125
High-income Coef. 0.70 0.62 1.02 1.32
Obs. 6651 8228 10271 12324
Religion important
Low-income Coef. -1.10 -1.07 -1.05 -1.19
Obs. 5121 5908 7526 8359
High-income Coef. 0.27 0.30 0.35 0.40
Obs. 6719 8307 10362 12459
Belief in Heaven
Low-income Coef. -4.46 -2.45 -3.30 -7.86
Obs. 4355 4960 6141 6751
High-income Coef. 0.32 0.47 0.61 0.78
Obs. 6289 7730 9569 11410
God Important
Low-income Coef. -1.20 -1.22 -1.29 -1.40
Obs. 5018 5810 7428 8254
High-income Coef. 0.31 0.31 0.35 0.41
Obs. 6691 8281 10337 12424
Bold coefficients are significant at 5%. All specifications estimated with country fixed effects.
Results for other explaining variables are available on request.
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